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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Case No, 14301 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a national 
banking association, and HOME 
ABSTRACT COMPANY, a corporation, 
as Trustee, 
Plaintiffs & Respondents, 
vs0 
REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, INC. 
et al0, 
Defendant & Appellant* 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
* * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought to foreclose as a mortgage 
a duly recorded trust deed given to plaintiffs to secure 
Proudfit's obligations to the plaintiff Bank for repayment of a 
large loan made by the bank and evidenced by certain promissory 
notes, in which defendant-appellant Remington Arms Company, Inc, 
claims priority for a judgment docketed against Proudfit after 
the trust deed was recorded* 
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DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court without a jury, and 
the trial court found and determined that plaintiffsf trust 
deed had priority over defendant Remington^ subsequently 
docketed judgment and granted a decree of foreclosure which 
denied Remington's claim of priority for its subsequent judg-
ment lien# 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENTS 
Respondents seek affirmation of the trial courtfs 
judgmento 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as defendant-appellantfs statement of facts 
is incomplete in some essential particulars, it becomes neces-
sary for the plaintiffs-respondents to restate the facts to 
supply the omissions and clarify the situation before the court0 
Inasmuch as the transcript of the testimony was prepared and 
forwarded as a separate volume after the original record had 
been forwarded to the Supreme Court, we shall make references 
to the original record by use of the letter, lfR,M and to the 
transcript of the testimony of the sole witness by the use of 
the letter "To" 
In general, it appears that there is no dispute as 
-2-
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to the controlling facts, which are set out in the findings 
of fact made by the trial court, and so, for convenience, we 
shall for our statement of facts summarize the trial courtfs 
findings with references thereto, but with supplemental 
references to the transcript where that would appear to be 
helpful. 
In 1967 the defendant Proudfit Sporting Goods Co. 
(hereafter f'Proudfit") obtained a loan from the plaintiff Bank 
in the amount of Forty Five Thousand Dollars ($45,000.00). In 
November of 1970, Proudfit had not completely repaid that loan 
and requested a renewal and extension of its unpaid balance 
and the loan of additional money. The request was granted, 
additional money was lent, and Proudfit executed and delivered 
to the Bank its trust deed in the principal amount of Sixty 
Three Thousand Dollars ($63,000.00), representing the balance 
of the old loan plus the additional loan made at the time, and 
secured the same by a certain trust deed conveying the property 
in question to trustee Home Abstract Company as security for 
the original and the additional new loans represented by a 
renewal note then executed. On May 12, 1971, the said trust 
deed was duly recorded in the office of the County Recorder of 
-3-
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of Weber County, Utah* (Court's Findings Paragraph 1 & 2, R0 
59 & 60, T. Page 8 Line 23 to Page 10 Line 12, and plaintiffs1 
Exhibits B & C0) It is important to note that the trust deed, 
Exhibit C, specifically provides, at the bottom of the first 
page and the top of the second page of said trust deed, that 
it is given for the purpose of securing ''payment of the indebt-
edness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, 
c o . and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications 
thereof o • ."In other words, it secured the indebtedness and not 
merely the note which is evidence of the indebtedness. 
Remington has a judgment lien upon the subject premises based 
upon the judgment docketed December 15, 1971, some Seven (7) 
months after the recording of the plaintiff Bank's trust deed, 
(Court's Finding Number 10, R. 64.) On June 19, 1972, Proudfit 
was in default in the payment of interest accrued and payable 
under the trust deed note Exhibit B and requested that the 
plaintiff Bank renew its then indebtedness of principal and 
interest by a new note. The Bank granted the request and on that 
day Proudfit Company executed and delivered to the Bank the 
note, Exhibit D, "as a renewal and extension of its unpaid 
obligations under the trust deed note of November 23, 1970, 
-4-
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Exhibit Bo (Court's Finding Number 3, R. 60 & 61o) As the 
uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff's witness, Thomas 
D0 Deefshows, this transaction was a renewal of the loan and 
note representing the same, and not a payment of the prior 
note. (T. 10, Line 13 to T. 11, Line 13o) It should also be, 
noted that the extension note, Exhibit Dfin its left hand 
margin has a reference to this security in the terms of Mtrust 
deed, guaranty, stock, gpa#lf 
When Proudfit defaulted on this final extension note, 
plaintiff Bank brought this foreclosure action alleging the 
obligation evidenced by the trust deed note of November 23, 
1970, Exhibit B, renewed by the renewal note of June 19, 1972, 
Exhibit D, with the indebtedness represented by the notes sec-
ured by the trust deed, Exhibit C, and prayed for foreclosure 
and that Remington's judgment lien be adjudicated subsequent 
and inferior to the trust deec^  and that the defendants, includ-
ing Remington, having claims subsequent to the execution of the 
mortgage, as encumbrances or otherwise, be barred and foreclosed 
of all rights, claims or equity of redemption except as speci-
fically provided by law0 
Remington appeared and answered the complaint (R0 43 
& 44), In essence the answer was merely a general denial plus 
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an admission that Remington claims an interest upon the pre-
mises and a statement that the claim is by virtue of a judg-
ment against Proudfit dated December 15, 1971, and a claim 
that the judgment is superior to the claims of all other 
parties. 
It must be noted that nowhere in its answer does 
Remington claim or allege the affirmative defense that the 
original obligation to the Bank evidenced by the note and 
trust deed of 1970, had been paid in whole or in part. 
On the evidence and findings above outlined the 
trial court found that the obligations of Proudfit to the Bank 
represented by the Two (2) promissory notes were unpaid, and 
were secured by the trust deed and entered a degree of fore-
closure and a decree that Remington!s judgment lien of 
December 15, 1971, was subject and inferior to the lien of the 
trust deed recorded May 12, 1971, and foreclosed all of 
Remington's rights under its lien as against the property in 
question, saving only its right to redemption as provided by 
law. (R# 58 to 69). 
This appeal followed, 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
REMINGTON JUDGMENT LIEN OF DECEMBER 15, 1971, WAS INFERIOR AND 
SUBORDINATE TO RESPONDENT BANK'S RIGHTS UNDER ITS TRUST DEED 
EXECUTED NOVEMBER 23, 1970, AND RECORDED MAY 12, 1971, AND THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Under Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pay-
ment is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded, which 
defendant Remington has not done0 Under these rules, which are 
copied from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defense of 
payment must be pleaded by one resisting plaintifffs claim, and 
proof of payment is inadmissible under a general denial. 60 Am 
Jur 2nd PAYMENT. Section 115, Notes 10 to 12. and Rees v0 
Archibald. 6 Utah 2nd 264. 311 Pac. 2nd 788. Note 9o 
In the case at bar, all of the evidence is to the 
effect that the trust deed in question secures and was intended 
to secure the indebtedness, and not merely the note which was 
evidence of the indebtedness. As previously noted, the trust 
deed provides that it was given "for the purpose of securing 
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note 
. . o and any extensions or renewals" thereof* And the only 
testimony presented to the court was to the effect that the 
renewal note was given and accepted, not as payment, but merely 
-7-
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as an extension of the previously existing indebtedness. On 
the evidence the trial court found (Finding Number 3, R. 60-61) 
that Proudfit, in June, 1972, "requested that the plaintiff 
Bank renew its then indebtedness, . „ by a new note, which 
request was granted by plaintiff Bank.
 0 » and at the same time 
defendant Proudfit Sporting Goods Co. executed and delivered 
to the Bank its certain promissory note. , , as a renewal and 
extension of its unpaid obligations," under the previous trust 
deed notec (Emphasis Supplied.) The trial court having found, 
upon uncontradicted evidence, that the new note was a "renewal 
and extension" of the debtor's unpaid obligations under the 
previous note, the findings of the trial court will be honored 
by this Honorable Court under the universally followed rule 
and practice. 
And the finding that the new note was given as a 
"renewal and extension" of the previously existing obligation, 
is, by necessary inference, a finding that it was not executed, 
delivered or received as "payment" of the previously existing 
and continuing secured obligation. 
The trial court's finding and conclusion that the new 
note was in renewal of the existing indebtedness rather than in 
payment thereof is strengthened by the law relating to the bur-
-8-
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den of proof and presumptions relating to payment. In 55 Am 
Jur 2nd MORTGAGES, Section 461 the rule is stated as follows: 
Instead of their being a presumption of payment, 
or settlement, of the original mortgage indebt-
edness, by the execution of a renewal note, and 
thereby a release of the security, the presump-
tion is that upon the execution of the new note 
or bond the same security is available for pay-
ment . In such case the mortgagor bears the 
burden of introducing evidence to show an alleged 
agreement that the mortgage should be released 
upon the execution of the new note. 
In the case at bar all the evidence introduced sup-
ports the legal presumption that the new note evidenced only a 
renewal and extension of time of payment of the original indebt-
edness, and not a payment thereof. In this connection it is 
probably worthy of note that in the case at bar the original 
note was not cancelled and surrendered by the Bank to the bor-
rower, as is customary in cases of payment of a note, but was 
retained by the Bank and introduced in evidence at the trial at 
the same time that the renewal note was introduced in evidence. 
Under these circumstances it is the rule in Utah as 
it is the almost universal rule elsewhere that the burden of 
proof to prove by clear evidence that the renewal note was 
intended as a discharge of the original note is on the party 
who asserts a claim that the note was discharged by renewal0 
-9-
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In this case Remington has produced ne_ evidence to support its 
claim that the new note paid and discharged the old, and all 
the evidence introduced by the plaintiff is to the effect that 
the parties did not intend to release or discharge the original 
note by the taking of the renewal note. See Gray v, Kappos. 60 
Utah 300. 61 Pac. 2nd 613. which is substantially identical with 
the case at bar. See also Interstate Trust Company v, Headlund. 
51 Utah 543. 171 Pac. 515. and the annotation at 52 ALR 1416 and 
following. 
Appellant cites only one case in support of its con-
tention that the taking of the renewal note by the Bank was a 
discharge of the indebtedness evidenced by the first note: 
Hatten Realty Company v. Baylies. 42 Wyo. 69. 290 Pac. 561. 
That case is clearly distinquishable. In that case the only 
evidence before the trial court was the sworn testimony that 
the note in question was given "not merely to evidence the 
amount due for the commission, but in absolute discharge thereof." 
In the case at bar, as indicated, the only evidence before the 
trial court was that the taking of the renewal note was not 
intended to pay or release the indebtedness evidenced by each 
of the Two (2) notes, each in turn. 
CONCLUSION 
As it clearly appears that all applicable law and 
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a l l of the evidence support the f ind ings , conclusions and 
judgment of the Honorable Tr ia l Court, i t s judgment should be 
affirraedo 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul Thatcher, of 
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